




Equal pay for all: an idea whose time has not, and will not, come  
(PENULTIMATE DRAFT) 
 





My task in this essay is to evaluate an idea: giving each person, regardless of profession 
or indeed whether he or she works or not, equal pay. I shall call this the equal pay idea, 
or EPI. 
 
We are to imagine an economy of X persons which generates (post-redistribution) $Y in 
national income (say, yearly). EPI, as I understand it, prescribes that each person receives 
$(Y/X). Under EPI, distinctions often thought to matter for economic or moral reasons are 
ignored. Everyone receives the same pay: doctors and mechanics; the lazy and the sedu-
lous; those for whom $(Y/X) is a bounty and those who cannot survive on it. 
 
Such an economy will require redistribution. EPI’s desired, hyper-egalitarian pattern of 
distribution will not (generally) arise via market forces. Among other things, a (well-
functioning) market does not pay someone if doing so does not entice her or him to work 
or otherwise contribute to production.1 But if EPI were in operation, we would doubtless 
encounter people who chose to not work – likely many of them – yet they would still 
receive $(Y/X). So there must be a government to produce the income distribution EPI 
demands. 
 
EPI is an ambiguous idea, and I shall discuss some of these ambiguities shortly. For ex-
ample, suppose that in Year 1 Jack consumes his entire share while Denise consumes half 
of hers and invests the other half. In Year 2, Denise’s investments produce $Z in income. 
Is Denise alone entitled to that $Z? Or does she only get $(Z/X)? It is important to clear 
up questions like these – to make EPI reasonably precise – if we wish to subject it to 
economic and moral analysis. 
 
We shall see that EPI, even when construed in its most attractive form, falls short – and 
badly. This is for two reasons. First, EPI is inefficient. It would remove nearly all incen-
tive to work, shrink national income, and leave all citizens badly-off – albeit equally 
badly-off. 
 
Second, EPI offends our sense of justice. I conclude this paper by briefly describing the 
empirical literature on justice, which suggests that human beings across lines of race, 
gender, socioeconomic class, and culture would reject EPI. Indeed, we reject more modest 
egalitarian distributive rules. 
 
EPI has not attracted support even among philosophers and economists with strong egal-
itarian sentiments. This is for good reasons, which I shall explain. I note, however, that a 
form of EPI has been defended by Joseph Carens (1981), and I recommend that work to 







What, exactly, is EPI? 
 
EPI should not be confused with a universal basic income (UBI). (See Zwolinski, Ch. 6 
in this volume; Cooke, Ch. 7 in this volume. The purpose of UBI is to supplement labor 
market earnings (if any), not replace them. Now, UBI is intended to replace elements of 
extant welfare systems, and for that reason (among others) I oppose it (see Mulligan 
2018b). I do, however, concede that UBI is a far more attractive prospect than EPI is. 
 
The first point to clarify about EPI is the status of benefits like health insurance and em-
ployer contributions to retirement. These are increasingly important parts of compensa-
tion in contemporary economies, and EPI would seemingly ignore them. That is, even if 
each citizen received $(Y/X) in income, those who worked might well receive enormous 
benefits packages from their employers, undermining EPI’s egalitarian goal. 
 
Similarly, there are non-pecuniary benefits and costs which would be important to incor-
porate into EPI. Some jobs – copyediting, say – offer flexible hours and working location. 
Other jobs, like hauling trash, are arduous. Markets price these benefits and costs into 
wages in the form of compensating differentials – the copyeditor receives less than he or 
she otherwise would because of the job’s non-pecuniary benefits; garbagemen are paid 
more because of the non-pecuniary costs. (See Brouwer and van der Deijl, Ch. 4 in this 
volume.) The proper index for EPI would seem to be total compensation, including pe-
cuniary and non-pecuniary benefits and costs. 
 
Next, we consider the question of investment income raised in the introduction. After 
each person receives his or her share, $(Y/X), some will choose to invest a portion of it 
rather than consume it in its entirety. Those investments will generate income which 
would, without intervention, create inequality. The question is whether that inequality is 
of the type EPI is intended to prevent. 
 
I think not. For one thing, the proposal is for “equal pay”, not “equal income” simpliciter 
– suggesting that the concern is labor’s share of income only.2 Moreover, if EPI extended 
to capital income as well there would be almost no incentive to invest, and thus almost 
no investment. This would be a catastrophe for economic growth. 
 
Then there is a question of scope. It cannot simply be that each person is entitled to a 
share, $(Y/X), because that would provide shares to infants, who cannot make use of them. 
This and similar cases (e.g. people in comas) raise non-trivial questions: are these people 
simply exempted? Does an infant’s share go to his or her parents? If so, must the parents 
spend it entirely altruistically, on the child? Or are the shares held in trust, so that upon 
reaching the age of majority (say, 18), a person receives $(Y0/X0 + Y1/X1 + Y2/X2 + . . . + 
Y17/X17)? 
 
EPI provides a share to those who do not work – but what about non-citizens? People 
who are in the country illegally? Criminals? We can wave aside these complexities, as-
suming that consensus has been reached about EPI’s scope, but in fact I think these ques-
tions would spark hot debate. 
 
Finally, it is difficult to evaluate a pay proposal like this without context on the welfare 
programs which would operate alongside it. Extant welfare programs are not typically 





needy groups like children and the elderly. (Of course, these programs may have the in-
cidental effect of making the distribution of income more equal.) 
 
Now, if EPI is to replace welfare programs, then I cannot see who would support it. It 
could not possibly be generous enough to provide even minimal support to, say, poor 
families with dependent children. This is a fatal flaw for UBI, in my opinion, and for EPI 
the problem would be worse. 
 
Thus, we are driven to suppose that EPI is intended to operate alongside a suitable welfare 
system. However, this itself is impossible, because the disincentive effects of EPI would 




On the inefficiency of EPI 
 
One fatal problem with EPI, albeit not the only one, is that it is “inefficient”. We might 
say, correctly, that EPI would make us poor, collectively and as individuals. But that is 
inadequate; the idea should be made precise. That is the main task for this section.  
 
We begin with an example. Suppose that Justin and Rachael wish to travel from Phila-
delphia to Providence by train. We may measure the benefit that this trip provides them 
by reference to their reservation prices – the maximum amount that they are willing to 
pay to take the trip. If the market price of a ticket is less than their reservation prices, they 
will, by definition, buy tickets. If it is more, they will not. If they do buy tickets, the 
difference between their reservation prices and the market price provides a measure of 
this trip’s economic benefit to them. 
 
Suppose that Justin’s reservation price is $120 – he will pay up to this amount for a ticket, 
and no more – and Rachael’s is $100. Suppose, further, that the prevailing price of a 
Philadelphia-Providence ticket is $90. This is what the train company receives for each 
ticket. What economic value is created by this market of two consumers, if any? 
 
We calculate as above: Justin would pay up to $120 but only needs to pay $90. Thus, the 
economic benefit he enjoys – his surplus – is $30. Rachael’s surplus is $100 - $90 = $10. 
Thus, the economic surplus in this market is $40.3 
 
We consider a tax’s effect on the total surplus. The government imposes, we’ll say, a $20 
tax on the ticket. The new ticket price is thus $110, $20 of which goes to the government 
and $90 of which goes to the train company. 
 
First we consider Justin’s situation. He would pay up to $120 but now must pay $110. 
His surplus has decreased from $30 to $10. He is made worse-off by the tax, to the tune 
of $20. However, this tax has generated $20 of revenue for the government, which it can 
transfer to a poor family, or spend on national defense, or simply give back to Justin. 
Taxing Justin has a redistributive effect – it changes who is made better off by an eco-
nomic interaction – but it does not affect the efficiency of the economy. The surplus re-






Second, we look at the tax’s effect on Rachael. Her reservation price is $100, and she 
enjoyed a $10 surplus before the tax was imposed. Once the tax is imposed, the price of 
a ticket rises to $110. But this exceeds her reservation price. Therefore, Rachael will not 
buy a ticket, and thereby not enjoy any surplus in this market. 
 
But what about the government? In Justin’s case, his surplus loss was offset by the gain 
in tax revenue. Does something similar happen with Rachael? The answer, unfortunately, 
is no. The government collects no revenue on market exchanges that do not take place. 
Unlike the case of Justin, in which the tax only served to change who benefits from his 
economic activity, taxing Rachael introduces inefficiency into the economy. It reduces the 
total surplus by $10. Rachael is forced out of the market by the tax, losing $10 in surplus 
which is not enjoyed by anyone else. This $10 of economic waste is known as the 
deadweight loss, or excess burden, of the tax. 
 
Let us now turn to a more general, and rigorous, example. Suppose that Jones may work 
at most 120 hours in a week, and that he earns a wage of $50 per hour. Jones thus faces a 
tradeoff between income and leisure, both of which he desires. For each $50 Jones earns, 
he loses an hour of leisure. For each hour of leisure he enjoys, he gives up $50. We may 





The vertical axis represents Jones’s labor choice; the horizontal axis, his leisure choice. 
At the extremes, Jones may choose to (1) earn $6,000 a week (120 hours of work at 
$50/hour) with 0 leisure and (2) $0 a week with 120 hours of leisure. Jones may also 
select any point in the segment connecting these two extremes, which we call Jones’s 
budget line. 
 
Which point on the budget line will Jones choose? This depends on his preferences. If he 
is already rich he will likely favor leisure to labor. If he enjoys his job, that makes work 
a more attractive prospect. If he is caring for a sick relative, he will want to earn money 






How preferences are formed and what, exactly, they are is a complicated matter. The 
important point is that Jones’s preferences, whatever they be, may be represented in the 
form of indifference curves. 
 
Three of Jones’s indifferences curves, A, B, and C, are shown in Figure X.1. The points 
on any given indifference curve are combinations of leisure and labor that Jones finds 
equally desirable. For example, indifference curve A contains the points (15 hours leisure, 
$2,800), (50 hours leisure, $900) and (80 hours leisure, $400). Jones is “indifferent” be-
tween these three combinations – he will derive the same satisfaction no matter which he 
chooses. 
 
Indifference curves are typically bowed inward toward the origin, as they are here, to 
represent the notion that people prefer mixes of goods to extremes. If Jones is not working 
at all, he may be willing to give up an hour of leisure for very little income. But as he 
works more and more, his free time becoming scarcer and scarcer (and thereby more and 
more valuable) he will want more money in return. 
 
The points in any given indifference curve are equally desirable to Jones, but the indif-
ference curves themselves are not. Jones prefers to have more income and more leisure. 
That is, he would prefer to move to the northeast in Figure X.1. Indifference curve A is 
the least desirable and C is the most desirable. 
 
However, Jones is constrained by his budget line, which defines all the combinations of 
labor and leisure that are feasible for Jones. Points on indifference curve C are infeasible; 
Jones would like to reach them, but he is limited to 120 hours to divide between work and 
leisure. Points on A, on the other hand, are feasible. However, Jones can do better – he 
can move to the northeast of A until he is on a curve that is tangent to the budget line –
that touches the budget line at just one point. This point is on indifference curve B – and 
here Jones must stop; all indifference curves to the northeast of B fail to intersect the 
budget line, and are, therefore, infeasible. 
 
If we understand Jones’s preferences (given by indifference curves) and the constraints 
he faces when making the labor-leisure decision (his budget line) we may solve for his 
optimal combination of the two. Here, the optimum is (60 hours leisure, $3,000). Jones 
divides his time evenly between work and play.4 
 
Now we consider the effect of a tax. Suppose the government levies a 33% tax on income, 
which Jones bears. This tax has no effect on Jones if he chooses not to work; he earned 
(120 hours leisure, $0) without the tax, and (120 hours leisure, $0) with the tax. 
 
But what if he chooses to work? The tax means that Jones will receive only two-thirds of 
the income that he previously did, for any given amount of work. In the extreme case, in 
which he devotes all his time to work, he earns (0 hours leisure, $4,000) rather than (0 
hours leisure, $6,000). 
 
More generally, the tax has the effect of flattening out Jones’s budget line. Points that 
were feasible when there was no tax no longer are. Consider the situation facing Jones 









We may see four effects of the tax. The first is the aforementioned flattening of the budget 
line. If Jones chooses to work at all, then, for any given amount of work, he will earn less 
than he would if there were no tax. He is now on a budget line that runs from (0 hours 
leisure, $4,000) to (120 hours leisure, $0) rather than (0 hours leisure, $6,000) to (120 
hours leisure, $0). 
 
Second, because the budget line has flattened, indifference curve B is no longer feasible. 
It is now akin to indifference curve C in Figure X.1 – out of reach for Jones. So to find 
Jones’s new choice between labor and leisure we do what we did prior to the tax – find 
the indifference curve that is just tangent to his (new) budget line. This is indifference 
curve D, and it is tangent to the budget line at (65 hours leisure, $1,800). This is the most-
preferred combination of labor and leisure for Jones under the tax. 
 
Third – and this is important – the tax has changed the preferred mixture of labor and 
leisure for Jones. Prior to the tax he divided his time evenly between the two. Now he 
trades some labor – five hours’ worth – for leisure. 
 
Fourth, the tax has made Jones worse-off. He would prefer to be on indifference curve B 
rather than D; B lies to the northeast of D. But the tax made that impossible, and so Jones 
finds himself on the less desirable D. 
 
We are now at a point to consider the efficiency effects of the tax. If someone else could 
be made better-off – as measured in dollars – as Jones was made worse-off by the tax, 
then there would be no inefficiency. The tax would have a purely distributional effect.  
 
Now, it is important to keep in mind that that alone would not make the tax “good”. A 
perfectly efficient tax that redistributes from virtuous citizens to vicious citizens is bad; 
an inefficient tax that redistributes from crony bankers to underprivileged children is 
good. Or so I think. Those are moral judgments which efficiency considerations alone 






We have established that, under the tax, Jones will work 55 hours and rest 65 hours. He 
will thus earn, pre-tax, $50 ´ 55 » $2,700. The government will tax away 33% of this, or 
$900. 
 
We must now determine how much worse off Jones was made by the tax. $900 is the 
difference between his pre-tax income and his post-tax income, and he certainly has been 
made worse-off by at least that amount. But it does not tell the whole story. It fails to 
account for the fact that the tax changed the relative prices of labor and leisure for Jones. 
The tax made labor costlier relative to leisure, inducing Jones to substitute some leisure 
for labor when, ceteris paribus, he would have preferred to spend those five hours work-
ing. This is a real cost, albeit a hidden one, which must be taken into account in our 
analysis. 
 
To calculate the true cost to Jones, including the cost of his leisure-for-labor substitution, 
we use a trick. We imagine that the government levies a tax on Jones that does not change 
the relative prices of labor and leisure; that is, that has the pure effect of making Jones 
poorer. Such a tax is known as a “lump-sum” tax. In particular, we consider the hypothet-
ical lump-sum tax that harms Jones exactly as much as the actual tax does. This is the 
lump-sum tax that puts Jones on indifference curve D, and is represented in Figure X.3 





Notice that the amount of revenue this lump-sum tax brings in is independent of Jones’s 
labor/leisure choice. The slope of the original budget line is the same as the slope of the 
budget line under the lump-sum tax, and so the distance between them is the same for all 
labor/leisure choices – namely, $1,100. 
 
To reiterate: The actual 33% income tax puts Jones on indifference curve D. A lump sum 
tax of $1,100 also puts Jones on indifference curve D. From Jones’s point-of-view, these 
taxes are equally bad. However, the actual tax only raises $900 in revenue. This difference 
of $200 between the actual tax and the hypothetical lump-sum tax is the deadweight loss 






If the government could levy a lump-sum tax, and not distort Jones’s incentive to work, 
it could raise $1,100, which is precisely the amount Jones is harmed by the tax. So there 
would be no efficiency loss.5 The tax would have a pure distributional effect. But only 
$900 is actually raised because of Jones’s behavioral response – his substituting of leisure 
for labor – and so there is inefficiency. 
 
The discussion to this point may seem abstract, and it is. But the abstraction helps illumi-
nate the general nature of the problem. Economists and policymakers struggle with the 
task of achieving a good distributional outcome – making some citizens better off by 
making others worse-off – while avoiding introducing too much inefficiency into the 
economy. As Arthur Okun (1975) memorably put it, redistribution is akin to carrying 
water in leaky bucket. 
 
A core problem with EPI is the inefficiency that it would introduce into the economy. We 
could all be given equal shares of the economic pie – no doubt about it – but only if the 
pie were made very, very small. 
 
Why would EPI be so catastrophic? Because it would eradicate almost any incentive to 
work. In the above example, the tax diminished Jones’s incentive to work but did not 
destroy it. In the face of the tax, Jones worked five hours less, was made worse-off by 
$1,100, and the government raised $900 in revenue.  
 
But under EPI, Jones’s income is independent of his labor/leisure choice! If he works 120 
hours a week, or 60 hours a week, or not at all, it does not matter – Jones “earns” the same 
income. So Jones will elect not to work, and the government will not raise any revenue 
from him. 
 
Jones’s choice not to work is a rational one, and it is made by everybody. That is, no one 
works – no one produces goods or services – and national income is driven toward $0. In 
this way, EPI ensures equal pay for all, and poverty for all. 
 
I have said that EPI would eradicate “almost” any incentive to work, because there would 
still be reasons for people to choose labor over leisure. I can think of two. (1) is boredom. 
If hobbies, exercise, spending time with family and friends, the arts, etc., etc., fail to oc-
cupy a person, he or she may elect to work despite its having no effect on income. In this 
case, goods and services will be produced and there will be some income to go around. 
(2) is altruism. Seeing the deprivations that EPI causes, some people will, nobly, choose 
to work. 
 
For this reason, EPI’s time has not come. For it to be plausible, people’s preferences over 
leisure and labor would have to radically change. To his credit, Carens recognizes (2), 
arguing that a “logically necessary prerequisite” to an EPI-like system is that “individuals 
. . . believe they have a social duty to earn as much pre-tax net income as they are capable 
of earning” and that they “place the same relative value on the satisfactions derived from 
performing their social duty . . . as individuals [in contemporary market economies do]” 
(1981, p. 25). But such a cultural change should only come to pass if EPI is regarded as 








The empirical work on justice 
 
EPI is a bad idea apart from any concerns about inefficiency. That is, even if it were 
possible to redistribute to provide “equal pay for all” without efficiency loss, we would 
still reject it – on grounds of justice. Put differently, EPI is bad from a distributional point-
of-view. 
 
When I say here that EPI is “bad”, I mean that people regard it as bad, which is not exactly 
the same as saying that it is bad per se. But by my lights, at least, the fact that EPI would 
be widely rejected – and by people across lines of gender, race, class, and culture – is 
strong grounds to think that it is morally flawed. 
 
As James Konow, an economist who has done extensive research on people’s judgments 
about justice, puts it, “empirical studies provide almost no support for egalitarianism, 
understood as equality of outcomes, or for Rawls’s difference principle [Rawls 1971]” 
(2003, p. 1199). The situation is even worse than that for EPI, since “equality of out-
comes” is usually understood to mean “everyone who works receives the same income”. 
EPI, which gives everyone the same income no matter if they work or not is much more 
radical than that. 
 
No: We do not believe that everyone should receive the same income. We believe that 
factors like effort and contribution matter from the point-of-view of justice. Someone who 
works hard and makes a significant contribution to our collective economic life should 
receive more in return than someone who, through indolence, contributes nothing. Some 
readers will think this obviously true, hardly worth stating, but note that EPI would not 
allow factors like that – factors that we commonly think matter from the point-of-view of 
justice – to affect the distribution of income.  
 
Owing to limitations of space I cannot give this matter a full treatment here. (I provide a 
summary of the empirical literature on justice in Mulligan 2018b.) I do want to note that 
when economic outcomes are unequal, the reason for the inequality matters critically. If 
two people have unequal incomes because of unequal opportunity – one was born into 
wealth and the other, poverty – that inequality of outcome does strike us as unjust. In 
contrast, economic mobility enables the possibility of just inequality (see, e.g., Shariff et 
al. 2016; Trump 2020). 
 
Similarly, if two people have unequal incomes for “arbitrary” reasons (e.g. racial discrim-
ination, luck) rather that reasons that have to do with their deservingness (effort, contri-
bution), that offends our sense of justice. But when deserts are unequal, justice requires 
that incomes be unequal as well. 
 
Our intuitions about desert, and its relevance for economic distribution, are powerful and 
broadly-shared. Indeed, there is evidence from evolutionary psychology that we are pre-
wired to think that economic outcomes should turn on deserts, and that, perforce, EPI and 
other egalitarian distributive rules are unjust. 
 
[T]he deservingness heuristic is rooted in evolved cognitive categories designed 
to detect and represent “cheaters” and “reciprocators,” respectively. The cross-





are not learned. Rather, they are something we as humans naturally come 
equipped with. (Petersen 2012, p. 12)  
 
Thus I see no reason to believe that EPI will come to be regarded as just in the future. 
 
EPI is a bad idea from the points-of-view of efficiency and distributive justice. It should 
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1 For this reason, the prevalence of economic rent in contemporary economies is a problem (see Mulligan 
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